Description : In this follow up to From a Market Economy to a Finance Economy, Samli reflects on his more than half a century of economic experience and research, maintaining that financiers, the government and many decision makers in both politics and the economy, do not really the 'free market.
Description : This book argues that the strength of our dynamic society is a market economy, which functions well only if positive and constructive marketing practices are performed. It offers innovative alternatives for achieving economic progress and outlines strategies to create conditions for equal opportunity. The American economy has transitioned from a “survival of the fittest" to "survival of the fattest" mentality, focusing less on the people and quality of life and more on the amount of dollars to be gained. The divide between the 1% and 99% leaves lower-income individuals at a significant disadvantage and threatens both economic and societal advancement. The author offers clear, intelligible solutions to accomplish this such as eliminating discrimination, providing opportunities for new ideas and industries, enhancing quality of life, and encouraging more competition so that radical innovations can emerge and make a positive difference. This book will appeal to leaders and researchers across marketing, economics, management, and accounting looking for answers on how to get the American economy back on track.
Description : This book discusses the current landscape of our market economy, which is in the hands of financiers and billionaires who decrease competition as well as consumer power. In order for society to fully thrive and provide its members higher living standards and quality of life, it must distribute and deliver the fruits of the economic activity without discrimination and favoritism. This book exposes the real problem of economic inequality, poverty, and the elimination of the middle class and argues for a progressive market economy in the face of regressive conservatism. The author warns of business failures, rigid and unrealistic laws, widespread unemployment, and class warfare without a fair, functional system. Until action is taken to reverse this situation, our market economy will continue to be abused by the greedy and the powerful, stripping it of any potential for advancement and growth.
Description : The Economics of Time and Ignorance is one of the seminal works in modern Austrian economics. Its treatment of historical time and of uncertainty helped set the agenda for the remarkable revival of work in the Austrian tradition which has led to an ever wider interest in the once heretical ideas of Austrian economics. It is here reprinted with a substantial new introductory essay, outlining the major developments in the area since its original publication a decade ago.
Description : Subtly, a Web has always connected us. Now, the subtle becomes palpable. The World Wide Web unfolds as a global retina, tympanic membrane, and larynx, which enable each to redefine the meanings of 'proximity' and 'point-of-view.' Thus far, however, our new omni-organ has largely been put into the service of a dim ethos centered on profits, property, and survival-of-fittest. In End of Ignorance, we consider another possibility: that the Web might be utilized on behalf of conscious evolution, on behalf of 'educare'--to lead out. Until now, education on the Web has been framed within the familiar schooling conventions of close-by places, times, expertise, and financing. In this book, we attempt to see and speak from a more comprehensive perspective--from the viewpoint of 'noosphere,' Pierre Teilard de Chardin's word for encompassing, hominizing mind. We pose the question: Can noosphere, precipitated as the World Wide Web, provide a venue where hominizing-not-mechanical thought might gain systematic nurture by means of not-scarce education? 'Yes' is our answer. In End of Ignorance we propose Nooschool as a place where individual authentic interest might be evoked, nurtured, and refined-to-vocation. We advocate the systematic construction of a globally situated, omni-connected curriculum with stewardship protected from proprietary control.
Description : The scholarly publication [the journal] Market Process played the central role in the transformation of the market process school from a hesitant subset of traditional Austrian economics into a bold new research programme. . . . The articles included here are among the best of contributions the Austrian school has ever made, and deserve to be given a wider readership. From the foreword by Don Lavoie The Market Process presents a series of important and innovative articles written by economists of the Austrian School. Covering the gamut of economic issues, including equilibrium theory, free banking, public choice, and the problems of contemporary social reform, the book is an ideal introduction to the diversity of contemporary Austrian economics and its innovative trajectory of research in the late twentieth century. Drawing upon essays published in the journal Market Process during the 1980s, this book reflects an extended dialogue over the value and limitations of Austrian economics. It makes available to a wider audience contributions by some of the leading figures in the field. At the cutting edge of interdisciplinary research, it incorporates the latest developments in areas overlooked by neoclassical economists including process analysis, methodological subjectivism, and phenomenological hermeneutics. This book should be of interest to all those who seek an alternative to formal, neoclassical economics, as well as other researchers in the social sciences who study exchange processes. In addition, it will be of general interest to Austrian and public choice economists as well as historians of economic thought.
Description : This book is an introduction to the modelling of cash collateralised debt obligations (“CDOs”). It is intended that the reader have a basic understanding of CDOs and a basic working knowledge of Microsoft Office Excel. There will be written explanations of concepts along with understandable mathematical explanations and examples provided in Excel. A CD-ROM containing these Excel examples will accompany the book.
Description : Americans are confronted with a paradox: the United States has become increasingly long on competition and short on competitiveness. The growing debate on the competitiveness of the United States has been spurred by a less than salutary economic growth. Even with recent profound changes in United States antitrust laws, such as progress towards taking into account global competition, little scholarship has been compiled on the connection of antitrust laws to trade or technology policy. Antitrust, Innovation, and Competitiveness explores how the U.S. antitrust laws, especially the Sherman Antitrust Act, have affected the ways in which U.S. corporations can compete in world markets. The editors begin with the consideration that current antitrust laws unwisely restrain innovation and competitiveness by inhibiting desirable pro-competitive communication, cooperation, and alliances among firms. This results in an impediment to the performance of U.S. firms competing in industries experiencing rapid technological change. Not all of the contributors agreed with the editors about the degree to which the antitrust laws do indeed inhibit innovation or U.S. industrial performance. Thus, the book represents a variety of views on a topic of increasing importance. Contributors include Professors Phillip Areeda, William J. Baumol, Ann I. Jones, Robert P. Merges, Richard R. Nelson, Janusz A. Ordover, Thomas M. Jorde, Richard Schmalensee, Lawrence A. Sullivan, David J. Teece, Oliver E. Williamson, and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook.
Description : In the field of antitrust, the freedoms to contract and compete can and do contradict. Profit-maximizing companies desire perfectly competitive input markets to minimize their costs, but want monopolistic markets for their outputs to maximize their profits. Consequently, they have strong incentives to undermine competition in their output markets. In a world without antitrust laws, many companies would thus eliminate competition by using their freedom to contract, either by entering into legally enforceable agreements which fix prices or divide up markets, or by merging and acquiring rivals to gain market control. Therefore, guaranteeing and safeguarding companies' abilities to compete comes at the cost of restricting their freedoms to contract. The states role in this task is a delicate one though: government intervention itself necessarily limits the economic freedom of individuals and firms, and limiting the freedom of contract has potentially detrimental effects on economic activity as well. Hence, antitrust policy must find the right balance between the two freedoms of competition and contract, allowing competition to flourish while upholding the contractual freedoms necessary for a functioning market. The policies in the U.S. and Europe used to protect competition with per se rules, setting clear boundaries for the freedom to contract where it interfered with the freedom to compete. Over the past decades, improvements in economic analysis provided measurable dimensions for 'competition' through measures like efficiency and welfare. With these new and complex economic tools, the aim of an antitrust policy moved away from an 'indirect' mechanism which provided and enforced a strict framework of negative per se rules within which the competitive process was allowed to happen. The current policies directly aim at promoting welfare by attempting to 'balance' the welfare effects of individual business practices, permitting contracts or mergers with benign effects and prohibiting contracts with detrimental effects on welfare in potentially every case. These economic insights have promoted a better understanding of the competitive process and contributed to improved antitrust rules. However, in the actual enforcement of antitrust laws, recent developments caused by the influence of economic analysis have had a detrimental impact on antitrust policy in both the U.S. and the EU. First, it increased the discretion of competition authorities, lowering legal certainty for companies and increasing the potential for wrong decisions. Second, it gave companies incentives to waste resources on rent seeking activities by using economic analyses to demonstrate efficiencies in complicated and timely investigations and litigation. And third, the predominant use of economic analysis has massively increased the costs of enforcement. This thesis is the first one to depict these negative effects caused by recent developments and shows that a policy with clear limitations through proposed per se rules would be superior for it would eliminate the illustrated negative effects.