Description : How Good Policing Can Help Fight Insurgencies In Conflict-Ridden Societies. Globally, the role of local police has been receiving increased attention following conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The criminalization of insurgent networks coupled with the growing nexus of warlords and drug lords and porous borders in many conflict areas have also bolstered the case for good policing. This book makes a case for the increased role of local/state police in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations by citing the successful implementation of this strategy in the state of Tripura led by the author himself. This makes Tripura the only state after Punjab and Andhra Pradesh where the police have taken full control of such operations. The work combines rigorous scholarship and research on general policing and COIN operations with incisive analysis of multiple insurgencies/terrorist movements in India.
Description : In his book, On Guerilla Warfare, Mao Tse-Tung stated that the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. If the guerrilla is the fish in this famous dictum and the people are the sea, then police intelligence is the blue fish which lives and moves and hunts within that sea as easily as does the guerrilla. All modern counterinsurgency theories rely upon some form of separating the people from the insurgent. This book contends that the use of police intelligence will allow for a different approach; that of separating the insurgent head from the insurgent body with the result that the body is seen as an infection by the people and loses its protective camouflage. The existence of police intelligence and its unique but all too often marginalised capacity for uncovering and destroying the prime movers of an insurgency must be re-examined in the study of counterinsurgency. It is by no means a panacea for civil strife but, as an integral component of a combined counterinsurgency strategy, it provides a weapon which is more feared by insurgents than any number of missiles, armored vehicles or boots on the ground. Knowing who they are and where they may be found renders the insurgent visible and touchable. This is the natural role of police intelligence as the ferreting out of organised criminal networks and the identification and apprehension of their members is a natural sub-set of intelligence-led policing. This book will explain and discuss the various elements of police intelligence ubiquitous to the trade while ultimately presenting the most efficacious means of employing this already well understood skill set in the environment of a counterinsurgency.
Description : When the U.S. military began its "surge" in Iraq in 2006, counterinsurgency effectively became its dominant approach for fighting wars. Yet many of the major controversies and debates surrounding counterinsurgency operations have turned not on military questions but on legal ones: Who can the U.S. military attack with drones? Is the occupation of Iraq legitimate? What tradeoffs should the military make between self-protection and civilian casualties? What is the right framework for negotiating with the Taliban? How can we build the rule of law in Afghanistan? The Counterinsurgent's Constitution tackles this wide range of legal issues from the vantage point of counterinsurgency strategy. It explains why law matters in counterinsurgency, how law operates during counterinsurgency, and how law and counterinsurgency strategy can be better integrated. As Ganesh Sitaraman shows, far from being opposed, law and strategy are aligned and reinforcing. Following the laws of war is not just the right thing to do, it is strategically beneficial. Reconciliation with enemies can both end the conflict and preserve the possibility of justice for war crimes. Building the rule of law is not simply altruistic "nation-building," but an important strategy for success. The first book on law and counterinsurgency strategy, The Counterinsurgent's Constitution seamlessly integrates law and military strategy to illuminate some of the most pressing issues in warfare and the transition from war to peace.
Description : The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written in 2006, is a guide for the Army and Marine Corps to all counterinsurgency tactics and operations, designed for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. The first manual on counterinsurgency in 20 years for the Army and 25 years for the Marines, this book contains information on intelligence, integration of civilian activities, campaign design, execution, security, and sustainability, among other things. A fascinating read for anyone interested in military history and tactics. The U.S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND, also known as TRADOC, was founded in 1973, to train the soldiers and civilian leaders of the U.S. Army, to develop operational policy, and to anticipate future operational needs of the Army. The U.S. MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND is responsible for training and indoctrinating the Marine Corps, cultivating war fighting abilities to make marines ready for combat. Training areas include leadership, education, organization, and requirements development.
Description : Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Description : This timely and critical volume questions the effectiveness of Britain's 'hearts and minds' approach, challenging conventional counterinsurgency thinking by drawing on the expertise of regional and thematic specialists.
Description : Research Paper (postgraduate) from the year 2018 in the subject Law - Criminal process, Criminology, Law Enforcement, grade: 100, course: Independent Study, language: English, abstract: Terrorist activities, tactics and strategies are uncoordinated and asymmetrical. These conditions do not fit into traditional law enforcement models. Since 9/11 out of the 60 plots 43 where stopped by local law enforcement officers. The COIN warfare theory first championed by French Army Lieutenant Colonel David Galula has served as the foundation for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps revision of the U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual. The theory's basic premise is that the government can only succeed when the population at large rejects the rebels, their message and works with authorities. A counterinsurgency strategy for law enforcement would require the establishment of a persistent presence, psychological operations that enables the community to discern facts and rumors, and carefully select, train and supervise law enforcement personnel suited for complicated tasks. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory can be used as a crime control model that incorporates police practice and operations of crime control and anti/counterterrorism.
Description : After defeating the Philippine Republic's conventional forces in 1899, the U.S. Army was broken up into small garrisons to prepare Luzon for colonial rule. The Filipino nationalists transformed their resistance into a guerrilla warfare that varied so grea