Public Finance

"Public Finance"--while continuing to follow an innovative approach that is both theoretical and empirical--is now completely updated to reflect major changes in its key topics. New or revised information includes explanations of the Social Security trust fund, a new section on the alternative minimum tax (AMT), possible links between the corporation tax and high-profile scandals such as Enron, and more.. .

Featuring a general equilibrium framework that is both cohesive and versatile, the Second Edition of Public Finance: A Normative Theory brings new and updated information to this classic text. Through its concentration on the microeconomic theory of the public sector in the context of capitalist market economics it addresses the subjects traditionally at the heart of public sector economics, including public good theory, theory of taxation, welfare analysis, externalities, tax incidence, cost benefit analysis, and fiscal federalism. Its goal of providing a foundation, rather than attempting to present the most recent scholarship in detail, makes this Second Edition both a valuable text and a resource for professionals. * Second edition provides new and updated information * Focuses on the heart of public sector economics, including public expenditure theory and policy, tax theory and policy, cost benefit-analysis, and fiscal federalism * Features a cohesive and versatile general equilibrium framework

Although coercion is a fundamental and unavoidable part of our social lives, economists have not offered an integrated analysis of its role in the public economy. The essays in this book focus on coercion arising from the operation of the fiscal system, a major part of the public sector. Collective choices on fiscal matters emerge from and have all the essential characteristics of social interaction, including the necessity to force unwanted actions on some citizens. This was recognized in an older tradition in public finance which can still serve as a starting point for modern work. The contributors to the volume recognize this tradition, but add to it by using contemporary frameworks to study a set of related issues concerning fiscal coercion and economic welfare. These issues range from the compatibility of an open access society with the original Wicksellian vision to the productivity of coercion in experimental games.

The main problem of public finance is how to improve the way tax money is spent, increase the efficiency of the economy and change the distribution of income in several desirable ways. Contributions by various authors dealing with subjects, such as: The distribution of the tax burden; Public sector dynamics; Public goods and the invisible hand; Federalism and government finance; Tax policy; Integrating allocation and stabilization budgets. In the chapter Public Sector Dynamics is dealt with the public debt and the following questions are treated: Does public debt have any effect? What effects does it have? How is it determined politically? And how is it meant! One of the conclusions is that future government claims and liabilities cannot be valued at their market value.

Studies of public finance, as traditionally developed, have analyzed the effects of fiscal institutions on the market-choice behavior of individuals and firms, but this book takes a different approach. It analyzes the effects of fiscal institutions on the political-choice behavior of individuals as they participate variously in the decision-making processes of democracies. What effect will the form of a new tax have on individuals' attitudes toward more or less public spending? To what extent does the private sector--public sector mix depend on the way in which tax payments are made? How do the various taxes affect the fiscal consciousness of individual citizens? These are questions that have been ignored for the most part. They are, nonetheless, important and worthy of examination. This book is an attempt to provide some provisional answers. By the use of simplified models of existing tax institutions, Buchanan predicts the effects that these exert on individual behavior in the area of political choice. The relative effects of direct and indirect taxes, the "old tax--new tax" distinction, the effects of fiscal earmarking, the effects of unbalanced budgets -- these are a few of the topics examined. Before these questions can be fully answered, research must be conducted to find out just how much individuals know about the taxes they pay and the benefits they receive. Comparatively little research of this kind has been completed, but the author devotes a chapter to a careful review of the present state of this sort of research. Individuals' choice among alternative fiscal institutions is examined in the second part of the book. If given the opportunity, how would the individual choose to pay his or her taxes? Progressive income taxes, excise taxes, and public debt are analyzed in terms of this question. Because of its interdisciplinary approach, this imaginative study will be of interest to both economists and political scientists.

This book discusses the principles of public finance, including public expenditure, the canons of taxation, the measurement of taxable capacity, the distribution of central, provincial, and local revenues, the distribution of the burden of taxation, the shifting and incidence of taxation, the taxation of land, the history of the taxation of income, general principles of the taxation of income, death duties or inheritance taxes, other direct taxes and the taxation of surplus, indirect taxation, customs duties, the burden of taxation, local taxation in various countries, public debts, and financial administration.