Why Air Forces Fail

According to Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, “Flight has been part of the human dream for aeons, and its military application has likely been the dark side of that dream for almost as long.” In the twentieth century, this dream and its dark side unfolded as the air forces of the world went to war, bringing destruction and reassessment with each failure. Why Air Forces Fail examines the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of defeat: forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States. The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, Arab, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the military leadership and its execution in the field. Anthony Christopher Cain’s chapter on France’s air force, l’Armée de l’Air, attributes France’s loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted in France’s airplanes’ being outnumbered by Germany’s more than three to one by 1940. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.

The Air Force (USAF) has continuously sought to improve the speed with which it develops new capabilities to accomplish its various missions in air, space, and cyberspace. Historically, innovation has been a key part of USAF strategy, and operating within an adversary's OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) is part of Air Force DNA. This includes the ability to deploy technological innovations faster than do our adversaries. The Air Force faces adversaries with the potential to operate within the USAF's OODA loop, and some of these adversaries are already deploying innovations faster than the USAF. The Role of Experimentation Campaigns in the Air Force Innovation Life Cycle examines the current state of innovation and experimentation in the Air Force and best practices in innovation and experimentation in industry and other government agencies. This report also explores organizational changes needed to eliminate the barriers that deter innovation and experimentation and makes recommendations for the successful implementation of robust innovation and experimentation by the Air Force.

During World War II, certain air force generals demonstrated an uncommon ability to succeed on the battlefield in spite of considerable obstacles. Whether solving operational issues, developing technical innovations, or devising logistic solutions, these commanders transcended service-centric doctrine and loyalties in order to achieve their objectives. Are there common elements among their personal background, professional education, officer development, and operational experience that helps explain their success? This paper will examine two contemporary tactical airpower commanders, Lieutenant General Elwood “Pete” Quesada and Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr Von Richthofen, in an attempt to answer this important question. This study comprises an analysis of two contemporary tactical airpower commanders from World War II, Lieutenant General Elwood “Pete” Quesada and Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram Freiherr Von Richthofen. It attempts to determine how they succeeded where others failed. Whether solving operational issues, developing technical innovations, or devising logistic solutions, these commanders transcended service-centric doctrine and loyalties in order to achieve their objectives. The author searches for common elements among their personal background, professional education, officer development, and operational experience that help explain their uncommon triumphs. The analysis includes both external and internal factors to determine which is dominant. The final section includes five recommendations intended for those who conduct officer accession, professional development, and promotion boards. The ultimate objective is to provide timeless criteria that transcend technological advancements and the changing character of war.

Airpower, more than any other factor, has shaped war in the twentieth century. In this fascinating narrative history, Martin van Creveld vividly portrays the rise of the plane as a tool of war and the evolution of both technology and strategy. He documents seminal battles and turning points, and relates stories of individual daring and collective mastery of the skies. However, the end of airpower's glorious age is drawing near. The conventional wisdom to the contrary, modern precision guided munitions have not made fighter bombers more effective against many kinds of targets than their predecessors in World War II. U.S. ground troops calling for air support in Iraq in 2003 did not receive it any faster than Allied forces did in France in 1944. And from its origins on, airpower has never been very effective against terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents. As the warfare waged by these kinds of people grow in importance, and as ballistic missiles, satellites, cruise missiles and drones increasingly take the place of quarter-billion-dollar manned combat aircraft and their multi-million-dollar pilots, airpower is losing utility almost day by day.

"For this first full-length biography of Wolfram von Richthofen, James Corum has mined the field marshal's extensive diaries, which provide a detailed record of military campaigns, tactical and operational problems, interactions with other commanders, and his assessment of methods and weaponry. He has also drawn on interviews with Former Luftwaffe members and on his unparalleled access to von Richthofen family papers and photos." "Cutting through the myths that have grown around von Richthofen's life, Corum's study fills a major gap in the literature and offers new insight into German military culture, Hitler's strategic thinking, and their impact on the German way of war."--BOOK JACKET.

Since the publication of the first edition of Why Air Forces Fail, the debate over airpower's role in military operations has only intensified. Here, eminent historians Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris assemble a team of experts to add essential new details to their cautionary tale for current practitioners of aerial warfare. Together, the contributors examine the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, this seminal study with two new chapters provides an essential and detailed analysis of defeat.

The evacuation of Dunkirk has been immortalised in books, prints and films, narrated as a story of an outnumbered, inexperienced RAF defeating the battle-hardened Luftwaffe and protecting the evacuation. This book revives the historiography by analysing the air operations during the evacuation. Raffal draws from German and English sources, many for the first time in the context of Operation DYNAMO, to argue that both sides suffered a defeat over Dunkirk. . This work examines the resources and tactics of both sides during DYNAMO and challenges the traditional view that the Luftwaffe held the advantage. The success that the Luftwaffe achieved during DYNAMO, including halting daylight evacuations on 1 June, is evaluated and the supporting role of RAF Bomber and Coastal Command is explored in detail for the first time. Concluding that the RAF was not responsible for the Luftwaffe's failure to prevent the evacuation, Raffal demonstrates that the reasons lay elsewhere.

Textbook for basic trainees and ready reference for Airmen during their military careers.

Of the first class graduating from the Air Force Academy, 172 entered Flying Training. Scores from the Academy selection tests, given five years earlier, were correlated with pass/fail criteria in Primary and Basic Flying Training, and with final grades in Basic Training. None of the College Entrance Examination Board scores were predictive of success in Flying Training. The Pilot composite of the Air Force Officer Qualifying Test had moderately high validity for passing both Primary and Basic Training. Neither of the sets of selection tests much discrimination for final grades of the successful students.

Two Roads to 1940 is a comparative study of the French and British air arms, from 1918 to 10 May 1940. Higham seeks the answer to the question “Why was the Armée de l’Air defeated in June 1940 whereas the Royal Air Force won the Battle Over Britain in September?” To reach a conclusion, the structure, the men and matériel, the government, and the economic infrastructure were analyzed. The story reveals that the French, dominated by the Armée de l’Terre, was hypnotized by “1918”; in contrast, the independent RAF evolved in the interwar years into a sophisticated, scientifically based force, which got the Air Defence of Great Britain (1924-1936) ready, was supported by government practices and consistency, as well as the necessary technical support for Fighter Command (1936-). Thus in 1940 the RAF could meet the Luftwaffe challenge. But the RAF also suffered from three major errors; no Air Officer Commander-in-Chief to control all the air commands, the almost fatal miscalculations of the power of Bomber Command, and the Army Ordnance’s refusal to develop the .50-caliber machine-gun instead of the .303. Serious historians and buffs should find the story salutary, as well as a detailed explanation of why air forces fail

List of members in vols. 1-24, 38-54, 57.