Description : Why does peace fail? More precisely, why do some countries that show every sign of having successfully emerged from civil war fall once again into armed conflict? What explains why peace "sticks" after some wars but not others? In this illuminating study, Charles T. Call examines the factors behind fifteen cases of civil war recurrence in Africa, Asia, the Caucasus, and Latin America. He argues that widely touted explanations of civil war—such as poverty, conflict over natural resources, and weak states—are far less important than political exclusion. Call’s study shows that inclusion of former opponents in postwar governance plays a decisive role in sustained peace. Why Peace Fails ultimately suggests that the international community should resist the temptation to prematurely withdraw resources and peacekeepers after a transition from war. Instead, international actors must remain fully engaged with postwar elected governments, ensuring that they make room for former enemies.
Description : How can we know if the peace that has been established following a civil war is a stable peace? More than half of all countries that experienced civil war since World War II have suffered a relapse into violent conflict, in some cases more than once. Meanwhile the international community expends billions of dollars and deploys tens of thousands of personnel each year in an effort to build peace in countries emerging from violent conflict. To build a lasting peace,more rigorous assessments of the requirements for a durable peace are needed. This in turn requires strong knowledge of the local culture, local history, and especially, the specific conflict dynamicsat work in a given conflict situation. To build a stable peace, it is argued here, it is important to take the measure of peace.
Description : In a world torn by political strife, mediation and conflict resolution offer hope for global stability. This timely book examines the peace processes in Northern Ireland, where a peace negotiation has been enacted, and the Middle East, a region still in need of peace. Beginning with a review of the literature and theory relevant to peace and conflict studies, the text offers clear, nuanced explanations of the Northern Ireland process, including how it was saved, and the Oslo peace process of the Middle East. Lessons are drawn from both situations, offering guidance for mediators, activists, and leaders dealing with ongoing ethnic or national conflicts.
Description : How to maintain peace in the aftermath of war is arguably one of the most important questions of the post-Cold War era, and one of the least explored issues in the study of war and peace. This book explains why some cease-fire fall apart quickly while others last for years.
Description : This book explores the recent changes in U.S. foreign policy, examines the roles that the six primary actors (the President, the Congress, the bureaucracy, non-governmental organizations, the media and the public) play in policy decisions, and assesses the potential for improvement within this system.
Description : First published in 1909, The Great Illusion sets out to answer one of the greatest questions in human history: Why is there war? Specifically, Angell wishes to discuss why there is war between the countries of Europe, which seem to always be at one another's throats. Angell refutes the belief that military power results in greater wealth and instead proposes that advanced economies based on trade and contract law can only generate value in the absence of military upset. War destroys any wealth that conquerors may have wanted to obtain, making the whole enterprise pointless. A deep understanding of this would, then, end the need for war. Students of history, political science, and peace studies will find much to ponder and much to argue with in this classic text.
Description : The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations—analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind—were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.